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Abstract
Social influence is ubiquitous in cultural markets, from book recommendations in
Amazon, to song popularities in iTunes and the ranking of newspaper articles in the
online edition of the New York Times to mention only a few. Yet social influence is often
presented in a bad light, often because it supposedly increases market unpredictability.
Here we study a model of trial-offer markets, in which participants try products
and later decide whether to purchase. We consider a simple policy which ranks the
products by quality when presenting them to market participants. We show that,
in this setting, market efficiency always benefits from social influence. Moreover, we
prove that the market converges almost surely to a monopoly for the product of highest
quality, making the market both predictable and asymptotically optimal. Computa-
tional experiments confirm that the quality ranking policy identifies “blockbusters” in
reasonable time, outperforms other policies, and is highly predictable.
These results indicate that social influence does not necessarily increase market
unpredictability. The outcome really depends on how social influence is used.
1 Introduction
Social influence is ubiquitous in cultural markets. From book recommendations in Amazon,
to song popularities in iTunes, and article rankings in the online version of the New York
Times, social influence has become a critical aspect of the customer experience. Yet there
is considerable debate about its benefits and its effects on the market.
In their seminal paper [13], Salganik, Dodds, and Watts argued that social influence
makes markets more unpredictable, providing an explanation about why prediction in cul-
tural markets is a wicked problem. To investigate this hypothesis experimentally, they
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created an artificial music market called the MusicLab. Participants in the MusicLab
were presented a list of unknown songs from unknown bands, each song being described by
its name and band. The participants were divided into two groups exposed to two differ-
ent experimental conditions: the independent condition and the social influence condition.
In the first group (independent condition), participants were provided with no additional
information about the songs. Each participant would decide which song to listen to from
a random list. After listening to a song, the participant had the opportunity to download
it. In the second group (social influence condition), each participant was provided with
an additional information: The number of times the song was downloaded by earlier par-
ticipants. Moreover, these participants were presented with a list ordered by the number
of downloads. Additionally, to investigate the impact of social influence, participants in
the second group were distributed in eight “worlds” evolving completely independently. In
particular, participants in one world had no visibility about the downloads and the rankings
in the other worlds.
TheMusicLab is a trial-offer market that provides an experimental testbed for measur-
ing the unpredictability of cultural markets. By observing the evolution of different worlds
given the same initial conditions, the MusicLab provides unique insights on the impact of
social influence and the resulting unpredictability. In particular, Salganik et al suggested
that social influence contributes to both unpredictability and inequality of success, with
follow-up experiments confirming these initial findings [15, 14, 11, 18] (see also [5] for a
perspective on the MusicLab paper).
In recent work [2], Abeliuk et al reconsidered the MusicLab setting by exploiting the
generative model that reproduces the experimental data [6]. They showed that social in-
fluence always benefits market efficiency, if participants are presented with the optimal
ranking, i.e., the ranking that maximizes the probability of a download at each step. Com-
putational experiments also showed that the optimal ranking significantly outperforms the
ranking in which products are displayed by decreasing popularity (known as popularity
ranking).
In this paper, we analyze the properties of a simple ranking policy for trial-offer cultural
markets: the quality ranking that simply orders the products by quality. We show a number
of positive results about the quality ranking, including the fact that social influence always
benefits market efficiency when it is used and that the benefits of social influence and po-
sition bias [8] are cumulative. Most importantly, we show that, under the quality ranking,
the market almost surely converges to a monopoly, assigning the entire market share to the
product of highest quality. As a corollary, this implies that the market is optimal asymp-
totically. These results are robust and do not depend on specific values for the appeal and
quality of the products. Moreover, computational experiments using the generative model
of theMusicLab [6] indicate a fast convergence to the asymptotic predictions: The quality
ranking quickly assigns the largest proportion of the market share to the product of highest
quality and outperforms other ranking policies. Also, there is only minor unpredictability
in the market under the quality ranking policy.
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Our results provide a sharp contrast with the conclusions in [13]. Under the quality
ranking policy, the market is entirely predictable: It converges to “blockbusters” and this
convergence is due to social influence. In other words, it is not social influence that makes
markets unpredictable: Unpredictability depends on how social influence is used.
It is also important to emphasize that the benefits of popularity, the social influence
signal used in this paper, have been validated experimentally. Indeed, two recent studies
[4, 19] were conducted to understand the relative importance of the different social signals
on consumer behaviour. The first study [4] surveyed the downloads of more than 500,000
from the Android marketplace Google play, while the second study [19] conducted an online
experiment (n = 168) where participants were asked to rank hotels based on the number
of reviews and the average rating. Both studies arrived at the same conclusion, namely
that the popularity signal (i.e., social preference) has a much stronger impact than the
rating signal (i.e., a state preference). These two studies provide evidence that quantitative
models with popularity as the social signal are of significant importance.
The relationships between quality, popularity, and appeal have also been studied ex-
perimentally. Stoddard [16] studied the relationship between the intrinsic article quality
and its popularity in the social news sites Reddit and Hacker news. The author proposed
a Poisson regression model to estimate the demand for an article based upon its quality,
past views and age among others. The results obtained after an estimation of each intrinsic
article from these social news site showed that the most popular articles are typically the
articles with the highest quality. Another study of social influence was carried out by [17] .
The authors conducted a field experiment which showed that popularity information may
benefit products with narrow appeal significantly more than those with a broad appeal.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces trial-offer markets
and Section 3 surveys the ranking policies used in this paper. Section 4 presents the main
properties of the quality ranking, including the benefits of position bias and social influence
and the asymptotic convergence. Section 5 describes the computational experiments and
Section 6 presents the final discussion. All the proofs are in the appendix.
2 Trial-Offer Markets
This paper considers a trial-offer market in which participants can try a product before
deciding to buy it. Such models are now pervasive in online cultural markets (e.g., books
and songs). The market is composed of n products and each product i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is
characterized by two values:
1. Its appeal Ai which represents the inherent preference of trying product i;
2. Its quality qi which represents the conditional probability of purchasing product i
given that it was tried.
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Each market participant is presented with a product list pi: she then tries a product s
in pi and decides whether to purchase s with a certain probability. The product list is a
permutation of {1, . . . , n} and each position p in the list is characterized by its visibility
vp > 0 which is the inherent probability of trying a product in position p. Since the list pi
is a bijection from positions to products, its inverse is well-defined and is called a ranking.
Rankings are denoted by the letter σ in the following, pii denotes the product in position i
of the list pi, and σi denotes the position of product i in the ranking σ. Hence vσi denotes
the visibility of the position of product i.
This paper examines a number of questions about these markets, including
• What is the best way to allocate the products to positions?
• Is it beneficial to display a social signal, e.g., the number of past purchases, to cus-
tomers?
• Is the market predictable?
The primary objective is to maximize the market efficiency, i.e., the expected number
of purchases. Note also that the higher this objective is, the lower the probability that
consumers try a product but then decide not to purchase it. Thus, if we interpret this last
action as an inefficiency, maximising the expected efficiency of the market also minimizes
unproductive trials.
Static Market In a static market, the probability of trying product i given a list σ is
pi(σ) =
vσiAi∑n
j=1 vσjAj
and the static market optimization problem consists of finding a ranking σ maximizing the
expected number of purchases, i.e.,
max
σ∈Sn
n∑
i=1
pi(σ) qi (1)
where Sn represents the symmetry group over {1, . . . , n}.
Observe that consumer choice preferences for trying the products are essentially modelled as
a discrete choice model based on a multinomial logit [9] in which product utilities are affected
by their position. Abeliuk et al. [1] studied a generalization of the maximization problem
(1) where it is not required to show all products to consumers. The authors interpreted the
problem as a optimal assortment problem with position-bias and they proved that it can
be solved in polynomial time.
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Dynamic Market with Social Influence The paper also considers a dynamic market
where the appeal evolves over time according to a social influence signal. Given a social
signal d = (d1, . . . , dn), the appeal of product i becomes Ai + di and the probability of
trying product i given a list σ becomes
pi(σ, d) =
vσi(Ai + di)∑n
j=1 vσj (Aj + dj)
.
The dynamic market uses the number of purchases di,t of product i at a time t as the social
signal. Hence, in a dynamic market with T steps, the expected number of purchases is
defined by the following recurrence:
ut(d) = max
σ∈Sn
n∑
i=1
Pi(σ, d)(qi(1 + ut+1(d[di ← di + 1])) + (1− qi)ut+1(d)) (t ∈ 1..T )
uT+1(d) = 0
where d[i← v] represents the vector d where element i has been replaced by v. The value
u1(〈0, . . . , 0〉) denotes the optimal expected profit over the time horizon.
Observe that the probability of trying a product depends on its position in the list, its
appeal, and its number of purchases at time t. As the market evolves over time, the number
of purchases dominates the appeal of the product and the trying probability of a product
becomes its market share. Note also that a dynamic market with no social influence simply
amounts to solving the static market optimization problem repeatedly. This is called the
independent condition in the rest of the paper.
In the following, without loss of generality, we assume that the qualities and visibilities
are non-increasing, i.e.,
q1 ≥ q2 ≥ · · · ≥ qn
and
v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vn.
We also assume that the qualities and visibilities are known. In practical situations, the
product qualities are obviously unknown. However, the quality of the products can be
recovered accurately and quickly, either before or during the market execution [2]. We use
ai,t = Ai + di,t
to denote the appeal of product i under social influence at step t. When the step t is
not relevant, we omit it and use ai instead for simplicity. Finally, also for simplicity,
we sometimes omit the range of indices in aggregate operators when they range over the
products.
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3 Rankings Policies
This paper focuses on the quality ranking which simply orders the products by quality,
assigning the product of highest quality to the most visible position and so on. In other
words, with the above assumptions, a quality ranking σ satisfies σi = i (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
The quality ranking contrasts with the popularity ranking which was used in [13] to
show the unpredictability caused by social influence in cultural markets. At iteration k,
the popularity ranking orders the products by the number of purchases di,k. Note that
purchases do not necessarily reflect the inherent quality of the products, since they depend
on how many times the products were tried.
The performance ranking was proposed in [2] to show the benefits of social influence in
cultural markets. The performance ranking maximizes the expected number of purchases at
each iteration, exploiting all the available information globally, i.e., the appeal, the visibility,
the purchases, and the quality of the products. More precisely, the performance ranking at
step k produces a list σ∗k defined as
σ∗k = arg-max
σ∈Sn
n∑
i=1
pi(σ, dk) · qi
where dk = (d1,k, . . . , dn,k) is the social influence signal at step k. The performance ranking
uses the probability pi,k(σ) of trying products i at iteration k given ranking σ, as well as the
quality qi of product i. The performance ranking can be computed in strongly polynomial
time and the resulting policy is scalable to large markets [2].
In the rest of this paper, Q-rank, D-rank, and P-rank denote the policies using the
quality, popularity, and performance rankings respectively. The policies are also annotated
with SI or IN to denote whether they are used under the social influence or the independent
condition. For instance, P-rank(SI) denotes the policy that uses the performance rank-
ing under the social influence condition, while P-rank(IN) denotes the policy using the
performance ranking under the independent condition. We also use rand-rank to denote
the policy that simply presents a random order at each period.
Under the independent condition, the optimization problem is the same at each iteration
as mentioned earlier. Since the performance ranking maximizes the expected purchases at
each iteration, it dominates all other policies under the independent condition.
Proposition 3.1 (Optimality of Performance Ranking). P-rank(IN) is the optimal policy
under the independent condition.
The following example shows that the performance ranking is not optimal in the dynamic
market.
Example 3.1. Consider the following instance with 3 products:
• Visibilities: v1 = 0.7, v2 = 0.2, and v3 = 0.01.
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• Qualities: q1 = 0.8, q2 = 0.5, and q3 = 0.1.
• Appeals: A1 = 0.01, A2 = 0.1, and A3 = 0.9.
In the first step, the performance ranking is σ∗ = [2, 1, 3], The expected number of purchases
at time 1 given ranking σ∗ is
λ∗ =
∑
i
vσ∗iAi∑
j vσ∗jAj
qi = 0.463.
The probability that product i is purchased in time 1 is given by
P ∗i =
vσ∗iAi∑
j vσ∗jAj
qi
which yields
P ∗1 = 0.0198, P
∗
2 = 0.432, P
∗
3 = 0.0111.
At time 2, there are four possible states, depending upon whether some product was pur-
chased at time 1. Let s0 be the state where no product was purchased and let si (i ∈ {1, 2, 3})
be the state where product i was purchased at time 0. The performance rankings for each
state are: σ∗(s1) = [1, 2, 3] and σ∗(s0) = σ∗(s2) = σ∗(s3) = [2, 1, 3]. The expected numbers
of purchases for each state are thus given by
λ∗(s0) = 0.463, λ∗(s1) = 0.783, λ∗(s2) = 0.496, λ∗(s3) = 0.423.
Therefore, the expected number of purchases of the performance ranking for the first two
steps is
λ∗ +
3∑
i=1
P ∗i · λ∗(si) +
(
1−
3∑
i=1
P ∗i
)
λ∗(s0) = 0.946,
where the first term is the expected purchases at time 1 and the second and third terms are
the expected number of purchases at time 2 given state si times the probability of state si.
Consider now the quality ranking which corresponds to the permutation σq = [1, 2, 3]
which is fixed for all possible states. The expected number of purchases for ranking σq in
each of the four states are
λq(s0) = 0.458, λ
q(s1) = 0.783, λ
q(s2) = 0.494, λ
q(s3) = 0.380.
The probabilities that product i is purchased at time 1 are given by
P q1 = 0.156, P
q
2 = 0.278, P
q
3 = 0.025.
As a result, the expected performance of the quality ranking in two periods is 0.975, outper-
forming the performance ranking by about 3% in this case.
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4 The Properties of the Quality Ranking
This section describes the main properties of the quality ranking.
The Benefits of Position Bias We first show that position bias always increases the
expected number of purchases when quality ranking is used.
Theorem 4.1. Position bias increases the expected number of purchases under the quality-
ranking policy, i.e., for all visibilities vi, appeals ai, and qualities qi (1 ≤ i ≤ n), we have∑
i viaiqi∑
j vjaj
≥
∑
i aiqi∑
j aj
.
The Benefits of Social Influence An important question in cultural markets is whether
the revelation of past purchases to consumers improves market efficiency. This section shows
that, under the quality ranking policy, the expected number of purchases in the studied
trial-offer model increases when past purchases are revealed. This indicates that both social
influence and position bias improve the market efficiency and their benefits are cumulative.
The proof uses a lemma from [2] specifying a sufficient condition for a ranking to benefit
from social influence.
Theorem 4.2. The expected number of purchases is non-decreasing over time for the quality
ranking under social influence.
Asymptotic Behavior of the Quality Ranking We now show the key result of the
paper: The trial-offer market becomes a monopoly for the best product when the quality
ranking is used at each step. As a consequence, the quality ranking is optimal asymptot-
ically since the best product has the highest probability to be purchased. The result also
indicates that trial-offer markets are predictable asymptotically. To prove the result, we
first characterize the probability that the next purchase is product i. Then we reduce a
trial-offer market with two products to a generalized Pólya scheme, a urn and ball model
with replacement. The result is then generalized to many products.
The first result characterizes the probability of the next purchase.
Lemma 4.1. The probability pi that the next purchase (after any number of steps) is product
i is
pi =
viaiqi
n∑
j=1
vjajqj
.
Consider first a trial-offer market with two products. Since the steps in which no product
is purchased can be ignored, by Lemma 4.1, we can use the following variables (1 ≤ j ≤ 2)
to specify the market:
Xj,t
.
= aj,tqˆj (2)
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Zj,t
.
=
Xj,t
Tt
(3)
Tt = T1,t + T2,t (4)
where qˆj = vjqj .
The trial-offer market can thus be modeled as generalized Pólya scheme [12], where Xj,t
represents the number of balls of type j at step t and Zj,t is the probability that a ball of
type j is drawn at step t. Since Xj,t+1 = Xj,t+ qˆj if product j is purchased, the generalized
Pólya scheme add qˆj balls, each time product j is purchased. As a result, the Pólya scheme
uses the replacement matrix (
qˆ1 0
0 qˆ2
)
. (5)
This Pólya scheme is known to converge almost surely to a monopoly whenever qˆ1 6= qˆ2
(see Theorem 6 in [12], whose proof uses stochastic approximation techniques [7]).
Lemma 4.2 (Monopoly of a 2-Product Market). Consider a Trial-Offer model with two
products of quality q1 and q2 (q1 > q2). The market converges almost surely to a monopoly
for product 1.
This lemma can be generalized when there are many products but only two values of qˆi.
Lemma 4.3. Consider a market with m products such that qˆ1 = . . . = qˆj = qˆ+ and
qˆj+1, . . . , qˆn = qˆ
− (1 ≤ j ≤ n) with qˆ+ > qˆ−. Then, the market share of products j+1, . . . , n
converges almost surely to zero.
We are now in position to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.3 (Monopoly of Trial-Offer Markets). Consider a trial-offer markets where
q1 > . . . > qn. Then the market converges almost surely to a monopoly for product 1.
This result has some key corollaries. In particular, the quality-ranking is optimal asymp-
totically, since only the best-quality song is left.
Corollary 4.4. The quality-ranking is asymptotically optimal in trial-offer markets.
It is also important to point out that the market is completely predictable at the limit.
For completeness, it is useful to consider the case where the products have the same
quality q and there are no position bias. In this case, the market share of each product
converges almost surely to a random variable following a beta-distribution. We prove this
result for the case of two products. By Lemma 4.1, the probability that the next purchase
is product i becomes
pi =
ai
n∑
j=1
aj
. (6)
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and the replacement matrix becomes the diagonal matrix qIn×n. Now
Zi,k
.
=
ai,k
a1,k + a2,k
. (7)
is a Martingale sequence. Indeed,
Ek[Zi,k+1] =
ai,k + q
a1,k + a2,k + q
Zi,k +
ai,k
a1,k + a2,k + q
(1− Zi,k)
=
(
ai,k + q
a1,k + a2,k + q
)
a1,k
a1,k + a2,k
+
(
ai,k
a1,k + a2,k + q
)
a2,k
a1,k + a2,k
=
ai,k
a1,k + a2,k
(
a1,k + q
a1,k + a2,k + q
+
a2,k
a1,k + a2,k + q
)
=
ai,k
a1,k + a2,k
= Zi,k
(8)
As a result, the market is equivalent to a classical Pólya-Eggenberger urn model where
the variable Zi,k converges almost surely to a random variable obeying a beta distribution
(Theorem 3.2 in [10]).
Theorem 4.4. Consider a market with two products of the same quality and equal visibil-
ities. The market share of product 1 converges almost surely to a random variable obeying
a beta distribution with parameters A1/q and A2/q.
Static Performance of Quality Ranking The previous section has shown that the
quality-ranking is optimal asymptotically in the dynamic market. We also know that the
performance ranking is optimal for the static market. This section shows that the quality
ranking has some performance guarantees even for the static market. In particular, it
presents a bound on the performance of the quality ranking which depends only the visibility
coefficients. The bound is also tight.
Theorem 4.5 (Static Performance Bound). The quality ranking is an α-approximation of
the static market optimization problem, where α = v1/vn. Moreover, the α-approximation
of the quality ranking is tight.
5 Computational Experiments
The previous sections have derived theoretical results for the quality ranking. In particu-
lar, they have shown that social influence and position bias always increase the expected
performance of the quality ranking. These results hold for all possible values of the product
quality, appeal, and visibility inputs. In addition, the results have provided strong static
and asymptotic guarantees for the quality ranking. This section aims at illustrating these
10
Figure 1: The visibility vp (y-axis) of position p in the song list (x-axis) where p = 1 is
the top position and p = 50 is the bottom position of the list which is displayed in a single
column.
results on settings that model the MusicLab experiments discussed in [13, 6, 2]. As men-
tioned in the introduction, the MusicLab is a trial-offer market where participants can try
a song and then decide to download it. It is important to emphasize that the generative
model of the MusicLab [6] uses the same model for consumer choice preferences.
The Experimental Setting The experimental setting uses an agent-based simulation
to emulate the MusicLab. Each simulation consists of N iterations and, at each iteration
t,
1. the simulator randomly selects a song i according to the probabilities pi(σ, d), where
σ is the ranking proposed by the policy under evaluation and d is the social influence
signal;
2. the simulator randomly determines, with probability qi, whether selected song i is
downloaded; In the case of a download, the simulator increases the social influence
signal for song i, i.e., di,t+1 = di,t + 1. Otherwise, di,t+1 = di,t.
Every r iterations, a new list σ is computed using one of the ranking policies described above.
For instance, in the social influence condition of the original MusicLab experiments, the
policy ranks the songs in decreasing order of download counts, i.e., the D-rank policy. The
parameter r ≥ 1 is called the refresh rate.
The experimental setting, which aims at being close to the MusicLab experiments,
considers 50 songs and simulations with 20,000 steps. The songs are displayed in a single
column. The analysis in [6] indicated that participants are more likely to try songs higher
in the list. More precisely, the visibility decreases with the list position, except for a
slight increase at the bottom positions. Figure 1 depicts the visibility profile based on
these guidelines, which is used in all computational experiments. Under this setting, the
11
Figure 2: The Quality qi (blue) and Appeal Ai (red) of song i in the four settings. In the
first setting (top left), the quality and the appeal were chosen independently according to
a Gaussian distribution. The second setting (top right) explores an extreme case where
the appeal is negatively correlated with the quality used in setting 1. In the third setting
(bottom left), the quality and the appeal were chosen independently according to a uniform
distribution.The fourth setting (bottom right) explores an extreme case where the appeal
is negatively correlated with the quality used in setting 3.
(worst-case) approximation factor of the quality ranking (see Theorem 4.5) is α = v1/vn =
0.8/0.2 = 4.
The paper also uses four settings for the quality and appeal of each product, which are
depicted in Figure 2:
1. In the first setting, the quality and the appeal were chosen independently according
to a Gaussian distribution normalized to fit between 0 and 1.
2. The second setting explores an extreme case where the appeal is negatively correlated
with quality. The quality of each product is the same as in the first setting but the
appeal is chosen such that the sum of appeal and quality is exactly 1.
3. In the third setting, the quality and the appeal were chosen independently according
to a uniform distribution.
4. The fourth setting also explores an extreme case where the appeal is negatively cor-
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Figure 3: The Number of Downloads over Time for the Various Rankings. The x-axis
represents the number of product trials and the y-axis represents the average number of
downloads over all experiments. On the upper left corner of each graph, the bar plot depicts
the average number of purchases per try for all rankings. The results for the four settings
are shown in clockwise direction starting from the top-left figure.
related with quality. The quality of each product is the same as in the third setting
but the appeal is chosen such that the sum of appeal and quality is exactly 1.
The experimental results were obtained by averaging the results of W = 400 simulations.
Performance of the Market Figure 3 depicts computational results on the expected
number of purchases for the various rankings and settings. They highlight two significant
findings:
1. The quality ranking exhibits a similar performance to the performance ranking and
provides substantial gains in expected downloads compared to the download (pur-
chase) and random rankings. On settings with a negative correlations between appeal
13
Figure 4: The Distribution of Downloads Versus Song Qualities (First Setting). The songs
on the x-axis are ranked by increasing quality from left to right. Each dot is the number
of download of a product in one of the 400 experiments.
and quality, the quality ranking performs better than the performance ranking.
2. The benefits of social influence and position bias are complementary and cumulative
as predicted by the theoretical results. Both are significant in terms of the expected
performance of the market.
Predictability of the Market Figures 4 and 5 depict computational results on the
predictability of the market under various ranking policies. The figures plot the number
of downloads of each song for the 400 experiments. In the plots, the songs are ranked by
increasing quality from left to right on the x-axis. Each dot in the plot shows the number
of downloads of a song in one of the 400 experiments. Figure 4 presents the results for the
first setting where the quality and the appeal were chosen independently according to a
Gaussian distribution. Figure 5 presents the result for the second setting where the appeal
is negatively correlated with quality and the quality of each song is chosen according to a
Gaussian distribution.
The computational results are compelling and confirms the theory. Figure 4 shows
14
Figure 5: The Distribution of Download Versus Song Qualities (Second Setting). The songs
on the x-axis are ranked by increasing quality from left to right. Each dot is the number
of downloads of a product in one of the 400 experiments.
that the best song always receives the most downloads in the quality ranking (with social
influence) and that the variance in its number of downloads across the experiments is very
small. The performance ranking (with social influence) also performs well but the best
song does not necessarily receive the most downloads and the variance in its download
is significantly larger. The download ranking is highly unpredictable, while the random
ranking is highly predictable as one would expect. It is also interesting to note that these
observations continue to hold even when the appeal is negatively correlated with quality,
as Figure 5 indicates. The contrast between the popularity ranking used in [13] and the
quality ranking in this setting is particularly striking.
In summary, the computational results confirm that, under the quality ranking policy,
the market is highly predictable. The song with the highest quality emerges and the variance
in its number of downloads is very small.
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6 Discussion
This paper studied trial-offer cultural markets, which are ubiquitous in our societies and
involve products such as books, songs, videos, clothes, and even newspaper articles. In these
markets, participants are presented with products in a certain ranking. They can then try
the products before deciding whether to purchase them. Social influence signals are widely
used in such settings and help promote popular products to maximize market efficiency.
However, it has been argued that social influence makes these markets unpredictable [13].
As a result, social influence is often presented in a negative light.
In this paper, we have reconsidered this conventional wisdom. We have shown that,
when products are presented to participants in a way that reflects quality, the market is
both efficient and predictable. In particular, a quality ranking tends to a monopoly for the
product of highest quality, making the market both optimal and predictable asymptotically.
Moreover, we have also shown that both social influence and position bias improve market
efficiency. These results are robust and do not depend on the particular values for the appeal
and quality of the products. In addition, computational experiments using the generative
model of theMusicLab show that there is a fast convergence to our asymptotic theoretical
results about the performance and the predictability of the quality ranking. These results
are in sharp contrast with the popularity ranking studied in [13], where the products are
ranked by the strength of the social influence signals. In these conditions, the market is
indeed unpredictable and less efficient. There are some important lessons to draw from
these results.
• It appears that unpredictability is not an inherent property of social influence: Whether
a market is predictable or not really depends on how social influence is used.
• With the quality ranking, it is not hard to predict popularity as the market will con-
verge to a monopoly. The computational experiments also show that “blockbusters”
are quickly identified, even when the appeal is negatively correlated with quality.
• Whenever the quality of the products can be approximated easily (e.g., by running
some experiments with a small number of participants or learning it on the fly as
suggested in [2]), the quality ranking is the policy of choice: It is predictable and
optimal asymptotically and is comparable, or outperforms, the performance ranking,
i.e., greedy policy that continuously optimizes the ranking based on the appeal, the
quality, and the social influence signal of each product.
• With the quality ranking, a high-quality product overcomes a poor appeal but the
opposite does not hold. A product of poor or average quality never become popular
even with a great appeal. Obviously, aligning appeal and quality makes the market
more efficient but it does not change the asymptotic outcome.
It is also interesting to contrast our results with the study in [3] which uses a different model
for consumer choice preferences. In their model, the probability to purchase a product is
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given by
pi(φ) =
eJφi+qi
n∑
j=1
eJφj+qj
where J is a constant and φi denotes the market share of product i. With this choice
model, with J is large, monopoly occurs and “eventually any of the products can get the
largest market share, so the number of equilibria is n” [3]. This comes from the fact that the
social influence signal is much stronger in this model, illustrating again that it is how social
influence is used, not social influence per se, which makes markets unpredictable and less
efficient. In other words, the popularity ranking reinforces the social signal too much while,
in the model from [3], the social signal may be too strong. Recall also that the choice model
used in this paper was shown to reproduce the original experiments of the MusicLab [6].
Overall, these results paint a very different picture of the benefits and weaknesses of
social influence. Social influence does not make the market unpredictable: When used with
the quality ranking, it creates a predictable market for our trial-offer model. Our current
goal is to obtain a broader understanding of social influence by generalizing these results to
different types of markets (e.g., markets with heterogeneous customers) and different types
of social signals.
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Proofs
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let λ =
∑
i viaiqi∑
j vjaj
be the expected number of purchases for the quality
ranking. We have ∑
i
viai (qi − λ) = 0.
Consider the index k such that (qk − λ) ≥ 0 and (qk+1 − λ) < 0. Since v1 ≥ . . . ≥ vn, we
have
k∑
i=1
vkai (qi − λ) +
n∑
i=k+1
vkai (qi − λ) ≤
∑
i
viai (qi − λ) = 0
and, since vk ≥ 0,
n∑
i=1
ai (qi − λ) ≤ 0.
It follows that λ ≥
∑n
i=1 aiqi∑n
i=1 ai
.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Let
E[Dt] =
∑
i viaiqi∑
i viai
= λ.
denote the expected number of purchases at time t. The expected number of purchases in
time t+ 1 conditional to time t is
E[Dt+1] =
∑
j
(
vjajqj∑
viai
·
∑
i 6=j viaiqi + vj(aj + 1)qj∑
i 6=j viai + vj(aj + 1)
)
+
(
1−
∑
i viaiqi∑
i viai
)
·
∑
i viaiqi∑
i viai
=
∑
j
(
vjajqj∑
viai
·
∑
i viaiqi + vjqj∑
i viai + vj
)
+
(
1−
∑
j vjajqj∑
i viai
)
· λ.
We need to prove that
E[Dt+1] ≥ E[Dt], (9)
which amounts to showing that
∑
j
(
vjajqj∑
viai
·
∑
i viaiqi + vjqj∑
i viai + vj
)
+
(
1−
∑
j vjajqj∑
i viai
)
· λ ≥ λ.
which reduces to proving
1∑
i viai
∑
j
[
v2jajqj∑
i viai + vj
(qj − λ)
]
≥ 0
19
or, equivalently, ∑
j
[
v2jajqj∑
i viai + vj
(qj − λ)
]
≥ 0. (10)
Let k = min{i ∈ N |(qi − λ) ≥ 0}, i.e., the smallest index k ∈ N , such that qk ≥ λ. We
have that
n∑
j=1
[
v2jajqj (qj − λ)∑
i=1 viai + vj
]
=
k∑
j=1
[
vjqj∑
i viai + vj
ajvj (qj − λ)
]
+
n∑
j=k+1
[
vjqj (qj − λ)∑
i viai + vj
ajvj (qj − λ)
]
.
By definition of k, the terms in the summation on the left are positive and the terms in the
summation on the right are negative. Moreover, for any c > 0 and vi, vj ≥ 0, we have that
vi
c+ vi
≥ vj
c+ vj
⇔ (c+ vj)vi ≥ (c+ vi)vj ⇔ cvi ≥ cvj ⇔ vi ≥ vj .
Since v1 ≥ v2 ≥ . . . ≥ vn ≥ 0,
v1∑
i viai + v1
≥ v2∑
i viai + v2
≥ . . . ≥ vn∑
i viai + vn
. (11)
Moreover, since the quality ranking rankes the products by quality and q1 ≥ q2 ≥ . . . ≥
qn ≥ 0, Equation (11) and the definition of k implies that
∀i ≤ k : viqi∑
j vjaj + vi
≥ vkqk∑
j vjaj + vk
,
∀i > k : viqi∑
j vjaj + vi
≤ vkqk∑
j vjaj + vk
.
This observation, together with the fact that the left-hand (resp. right-hand) terms are
positive (resp. negative), produces a lower bound to the right-hand side of Inequality (10):
k∑
j=1
[
vjqj∑
i viai + vj
ajvj (qj − λ)
]
+
n∑
j=k+1
[
vjqj∑
i viai + vj
ajvj (qj − λ)
]
≥ vkqk∑
i viai + vk
k∑
j=1
[ajvj (qj − λ)] + vkqk∑
i viai + vk
n∑
j=k+1
[ajvj (qj − λ)] .
Now, by definition of lambda,
λ =
∑n
i=1 viaiqi∑n
i=1 viai
⇔ λ
n∑
i=1
viai =
n∑
i=1
viaiqi ⇔
n∑
i=1
viai(qi − λ) = 0.
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which implies that
vkqk∑
i viai + vk
n∑
j=1
[ajvj (qj − λ)] = 0
concluding the proof.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. The probability that product i is purchased in the first step is given
by
p1sti =
viai
n∑
j=1
vjaj
qi.
The probability that product i is purchased in the second step and no product was purchased
in the first step is given by
p2ndi =

n∑
j=1
vjaj(1− qj)
n∑
j=1
vjaj
 viain∑
j=1
vjaj
qi.
More generally, the probability that product i is purchased in step m while no product was
purchased in earlier steps is given by
pmthi =

n∑
j=1
vjaj(1− qj)
n∑
j=1
vjaj

m
viai
n∑
j=1
vjaj
qi.
Defining a = (
n∑
j=1
vjajqj)/(
n∑
j=1
vjaj), Equation 6 becomes
pmthi =
(
1− a
)m viai
n∑
j=1
vjaj
qi.
Hence the probability that the next purchased product is product i is given by
pi =
∞∑
m=0
(
1− a
)m viai
n∑
j=1
vjaj
qi.
Since ∞∑
m=0
(
1− a
)m
=
1
a
,
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the probability that the next purchase is product i is given by
pi =
viaiqi
n∑
j=1
vjajqj
.
Proof of Lemma 4.3. The probability of purchasing one of the first j (resp. last n − j)
product next is
j∑
i=1
aiqˆ
+
n∑
i=1
aiqˆi
( resp.
n∑
i=j+1
aiqˆ
−
n∑
i=1
aiqˆi
). (12)
Hence, we can define a 2-product market in which product 1 has an appeal a+ and a quality
qˆ+ and product 2 has an appeal a− and a quality qˆ−, where
a+ =
j∑
i=1
ai and a− =
n∑
i=j+1
ai. (13)
By Lemma 4.2, this market converges almost surely to a monopoly for product 1. Hence
the market share for products j + 1, . . . , n converges almost surely to zero.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. Consider the generalized Pólya scheme S associated with the market
with n types of balls. Define a new generalized Pólya scheme S′ which is similar to S except
that qˆ1, . . . , qˆn−2 are replaced by qˆn−1. At the limit, the fraction of balls of type n in scheme
S′ cannot be smaller than in scheme S. Consider now the market that corresponds to S′.
By Lemma 4.3, the market share of product n converges almost surely to zero. The result
follows from Lemma 4.2 after repeating the process for products n− 1, . . . , 3.
Proof of Theorem 4.5. Let σ∗ be the optimal sorting and λ∗ its expected number of pur-
chases. We have
λ∗ =
∑
i vσ∗i aiqi∑
j vσ∗j aj
≤
∑
i v1aiqi∑
j vnaj
= α
∑
i aiqi∑
j aj
.
Let λq be the expected number of purchases for the quality ranking, i.e.,
λq =
∑
i viaiqi∑
j vjaj
.
By Theorem 4.1,
λq ≥
∑
i aiqi∑
j aj
.
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Combining both bounds yields λ∗ ≤ αλq.
We now show that the approximation is tight. Consider 3 products with qualities
q1 = 1, q2 = , q3 = 0 and appeals a1 = 1, a2 = x, a3 = 0 and let the visibilities be
v1 = 1, v2 = 1, v3 < 1. The quality ranking is σq = (1, 2, 3) and the optimal performance
ranking is σ∗ = (1, 3, 2). The expected number of purchases for the quality ranking is
1 + x
1 + x
while it is
1 + xα
1 + αx
.
for the performance ranking. When  tends to zero, the ratio between the performance and
quality ranking becomes
lim
→0
1 + v3x
1 + v3x
1 + x
1 + x
=
1 + x
1 + v3x
.
Hence, when x is large enough, the ratio is approximately α, i.e.,
1 + x
1 + v3x
≈ 1
v3
=
v1
v3
= α.
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